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1.0 Introduction
They were not to become an "object ofjealously" according to the British
and French in 1783.' True to this admonition, the French islands of St.
Pierre and Miquelon have remained as the uncontested footnotes to
France's colonial presence in North America. However, the ocean area
and resources adjacent to the French islands became the object of intense
jealously, being the centre of a thorny, 25 year international dispute
between Canada and France.
Canada and France both claimed exclusive jurisdiction over a pieshaped wedge running south from St. Pierre and Miquelon into the
Atlantic Ocean. While commonly referred to as an ocean boundary
dispute, the dispute was one of conflicting views over the allocation and
sharing of both the ocean space and the resources adjacent to the French
islands.
The 242 square kilometers (94 square miles) of St. Pierre and Miquelon,
with a population of 6,000, sits nearly ten nautical miles from the
mainland coast of the Canadian province of Newfoundland. Adjacent
rocks and islets reduce the neighbourly distance to three nautical miles.
Proximity did not make the dispute any easier to resolve. Canada and
France held conflicting views on the existence and application of international fisheries and boundary delimitation law, contrary assessments of
the geographic and economic importance of the islands, and, most
fundamentally, differing calculations regarding what would constitute a
politically acceptable compromise on ocean area and resource allocation.
The St. Pierre and Miquelon dispute provides an interesting case study
of international dispute resolution since the two countries employed
several mechanisms in attempting to peacefully resolve the issue. First
and foremost, Canada and France engaged in bilateral negotiations, the
mechanism of choice in dealing with international disputes. Bilateral
negotiation led Canada and France to agreement on some points, 2 but
negotiations ultimately failed to resolve the major issues of resource and
ocean area allocation. Following the breakdown of direct negotiations
and escalation of the urgency to resolve the dispute for diplomatic,
political and resource conservation reasons, the two countries utilized a

1. Definitive Treaty ofPeaceandFriendshipbetween FranceandGreatBritain,3 September

1783, 48 Cons. T.S. 437 at 469 (Declaration).
2. For example, Agreement on Their Mutual Fishing Relations, Mar. 27, 1972, CanadaFrance, reprinted in United Nations, NationalLegislationand TreatiesRelating to the Law of

the Sea (New York, 1974) 570 (U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/16, Sales No. E/F.74.V.2)
[hereinafter 1972Agreement] and U.S. Dep't of State, Office of the Geographer, Limits in the

Seas, No. 57 (Washington, D.C., 1974). See generally infra, section 3.2.
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mediator to assist them in finding common ground. With the help of the
mediator the two parties reached agreement to resort to third party
adjudication, an arbitral tribunal, in order to resolve the fundamental
issue of ocean space allocation.' Canada and France had hoped that the
adjudicative resolution of the ocean space dispute would also resolve the
ocean resource allocation dispute. It is clear from both the decision of the
Tribunal 4 and the subsequent actions of the two countries5 that this aspect
of the dispute remains unresolved.
It is argued below that the primary reason negotiations failed and
mediation was largely unused to resolve the Canada and France ocean
area and resource dispute was timing. When one country was ready to
consider a compromise, the other country was in an intransigent mode.
When one country felt urgency, the other felt complacency. They finally
did agree to use an independent Tribunal, but the only way in which the
Arbitral Tribunal could have fully resolved the dispute was to unabashedly side with either Canada or France: anything less than total victory for
one side or the other would leave the resources question unresolved. Not
surprisingly, the Arbitral Tribunal tried to find a middle ground. The
approach taken below is to outline the context and complicating factors
which were important in the search for a resolution of the Canada-France
dispute and then review the international ocean practice regarding
negotiation, mediation and adjudication and the use made of these three
mechanisms by Canada and France.
2.0 The Context and Complicating Factorsof the Dispute
Every international dispute has its own unique context and set of
complicating factors. The context of the St. Pierre and Miquelon dispute
was the evolving international law of the sea which allowed extended
offshore jurisdiction by coastal States, thus creating ocean area and
resources conflicts throughout the world. The complicating factors which
influenced the search for a resolution of the dispute were a 1972 Treaty
that guaranteed French fishing in Canadian coastal waters; the resource
needs of France coupled with the resource conservation concerns of
Canada; internal political pressures in both countries; and the geography
of the disagreement.

3. Agreement Establishing a Court of Arbitrationfor the Purpose of Carrying Out the
Delimitation of Maritime Areas between Franceand Canada,30 March 1989, 29 I.L.M. 1
[hereinafter the 1989 Compromis].
4. Case Concerningthe Delimitationofthe MaritimeAreasBetween CanadaandFrance,10
June 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1148 [hereinafter Canada-FranceCase].
5. See "Cod Protest Arrests" FishingNews International(January 1993) 52.
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2.1 The Conflicting Claims
Developments in the international law of the sea since the Second World
War have resulted in coastal States exercising jurisdiction over increasing areas of the offshore. The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf recognized that a State had sovereign rights over the resources
located in and on its adjacent continental shelf.6 In the 1970s, States began
claiming and exercising jurisdiction over living resources out to 200
nautical miles 7 and the 1982 UnitedNationsConvention on the Law ofthe
Sea recognizes the existence of national 200-nautical mile, multi-functional, exclusive economic zones.'
The 1958 and 1982 multilateral Treaties on the law of the sea accepted
that inhabited, self-sustaining islands could be used to generate offshore
jurisdictional zones.9 As a consequence, in 1966, France exercised its
jurisdiction over the continental shelf adjacent around St. Pierre and
Miquelon by issuing hydrocarbon exploration permits"° and in 1977
France declared the existence of a 200 nautical mile fishing zone for St.

6. Convention on the ContinentalShelf, 29 April 1958,499 U.N.T.S. 311, art. 1.

7. For example, the United States enacted its 200-nautical mile fishing zone in 1976 through
the Magnuson FisheryConservationandManagementAct,Pub.L. 94-265,90 Stat. 331 (1976)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-82 (1988)) [hereinafter FCMA].

8. 10 December 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122 (1982), 21 I.L.M. 1261, United Nations,
OfficialText of the UnitedNationsConvention on the Law ofthe Sea with Annexes andIndex
(New York, 1983) (U.N. Sales No. E.83.v.5), arts. 55-75 [hereinafter LOS Convention]. The
LOS Convention has now received its 60th ratification and will come into force for those States
which have ratified in November 1994 ("Sixtieth Ratification of theLaw of the Sea Convention
Deposited" (1993) 10:7 Oceans Policy News 1). Concerning Canada and the LOS Convention,
seeT. McDorman, "Will Canada Ratify the Law of the Sea Convention?" (1988) 25 San Diego
L. Rev. 535.
9. Article 1 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the ContinentalShelf,supranote 6, specifically

indicates that islands are entitled to a continental shelf. Article 121 of the 1982 LOS
Convention, ibid., directs that islands, which are not mere rocks, are entitled to a 12 nautical
mile territorial sea, a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone, and a continental shelf. The
1981 Icelandic-Norway Conciliation Commission took the view that Article 121 represents
customary international law (Conciliation Commission on the Continental ShelfArea between
Iceland and Jan Mayen, Report and Recommendations to the Governments of Iceland and
Norway, 20 I.L.M. 797).

10. Concerning the French exploration permits, see D. Day, "Maritime Boundaries, Jurisdictional Disputes, and Offshore Hydrocarbon Exploration in Eastern Canada" (1988) 23 J. Can.
Stud. 60 at 69-70; Canada, Canada-France:Case Concerning the Delimitationof Maritime
Areas: Memorial Submitted by Canada(Ottawa: Gdvernment of Canada, 1990) at 108-09
[hereinafter CanadianMemorial]; and Canada-FranceCase,supra note 4 at para. 8.
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Pierre and Miquelon." In 1966, Canada, exercising its offshore rights,
issued hydrocarbon exploration permits in the coastal areas adjacent to
Newfoundland and Nova Scotia.1 2 The permits issued by Canada and
France coincided in the shelf areas adjacent to St. Pierre and Miquelon.
Similarly, the fishery jurisdiction of Canada, extended to 200 nautical
miles in 1977,' 3 overlapped the fishery area claimed by France adjacent
to St. Pierre and Miquelon.
While claiming a 200 nautical mile zone, France accepted that the limit
of its claim was a line equidistant from the French and Canadian coasts.
France argued that full weight should be given the French islands and that
an equidistance (or median) line was the appropriate manner to delimit
the ocean space. 14 Precisely where that line was and hence the extent of
the French claim was not made public.5 The Canadian view, unaccepted
by France, was that the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon constituted a
"special circumstance" and that a "reasonable" ocean area should exist
for the French islands.' 6 The reasonable area was determined by Canada
in 1978 to be 12 nautical miles. 7 The 12 nautical mile "enclave" for St.
Pierre and Miquelon was the public position maintained by Canada
throughout the 1980s. 18

11. Loi n°76-655 du 16juillet 1976,J.O., 18juillet 1976,4299, regardingtheEconomicZone
off the Coasts of the Territory of the Republic. By D~cret no 77-169 du 25 f6vrier 1977, J.O.,
27 f6vrier 1977, 1102, the 200 nautical mile zone applies off the coasts of St. Pierre and
Miquelon. The legislation is reprinted in R. Smith, Exclusive Economic Zone Claims: An
Analysis and PrimaryDocuments (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986) at
147.
12. Concerning the Canadian exploration permits, see Day, supranote 10 at 69-70.
13. Regulations under the TerritorialSea and Fishing Zones Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-18:
FishingZones of Canada(Zones 1,2 and3)Order,C.R.C., c. 1547; FishingZones of Canada
(Zones 4 and5)Order,C.R.C., c. 1548; and FishingZones of Canada(Zone 6) Order,C.R.C.,
c. 1549.
14. Canada-FranceCase, supranote 4 at para. 5. See also T. McDorman, "The CanadaFrance Boundary Case: Drawing A Line Around St. Pierre and Miquelon" (1990) 84 Am. J.
Int'l L. 157 at 170-71.
15. CanadianMemorial,supra note 10 at 11-12.
16. As described ibid. at 108-09.
17. Seeibid. at ll7.
18. See T. Siddon, Minister of Fisheries of Oceans, Remarks in Houseof Commons Debates
(27 January 1987) at 2808-09 and C.R. Symmons, "The Canadian 200-Mile Fishery Limit and
the Delimitation ofMaritimeZones Around St. Pierre andMiquelon" (1980) 12 OttawaL. Rev.
145 at 153. It was also the position taken by Canada before the Canada-France Arbitration
Court. See Canada-FranceCase, supra note 4 at para. 5.
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2.2 The 1972 FishingAgreement
Since 1763, when St. Pierre and Miquelon were ceded by Great Britain
to France "to serve as a shelter to the French fishermen, 1 9 a right to fish
by French fishers in waters adjacent to Canada has been protected by
treaty.2' Renegotiation of this 200 year old right took place in 1972 at a
time prior to 200 nautical mile zones, when Canada was attempting to
remove foreign fishing activity from the Gulf of St. Lawrence. The 1972
Agreement between Canadaand Franceon TheirMutual FishingRelations drew a distinction between fishing vessels from metropolitan
France and fishing vessels registered in St. Pierre and Miquelon. The
former were to be able to fish in the Gulf of St. Lawrence until May
1986.21 Vessels from St. Pierre and Miquelon were to be able to fish in the
Gulf of St. Lawrence subject to Canadian quota control.22 If Canada
expanded its fisheries jurisdiction, fishers from Metropolitan France and
St. Pierre and Miquelon were to have access to resources in the newly
3
expanded waters, again subject to Canadian quota control?
Pursuant to the 1972 Agreement, fishers from St. Pierre and Miquelon
are entitled to a quota within the Gulf of St. Lawrence and French fishers
(either from Metropolitan France or the islands) are entitled to a quota in
uncontested Canadian waters outside the Gulf of St. Lawrence. The
nature and extent of the obligations in the 1972 Agreement have been the
subject of dispute between the two countries24 and the quota arrange-

19. Definitive Treaty of Peace between France,GreatBritainandSpain, 10 February 1763,

42 Cons. T.S. 279, art. iv.
20. Discussed in Filleting within the Gulf of St. Lawrence between Canada and France
(1986), 19 R.I.A.A. 225 [hereinafter La BretagneArbitration].
21. The 1972 Agreement, supra note 2, art. 3.
22. Ibid., art.4.
23. The 1972Agreement, supra note 2, art. 2 recognized the possibility of States expanding
their fishing zones. Article 2 of the 1972 Agreement became an important consideration in the
Canada-FranceCase.Article 2 obliges Canada to recognize French fishing rights in Canadian
waters and the French government is to reciprocate respecting Canadian fishing rights in
French waters. This reciprocity allowed the Court of Arbitration to construct an ocean
boundary confident that the countries would respect one another's rights in the newlydelimited ocean areas (Canada-FranceCase, supranote 3 at para. 87).
24. La Bretagne Arbitration, supra note 20, concerned the interpretation of the 1972
Agreement. See T. McDorman, "French Fishing Rights in Canadian Waters: The 1986 La
Bretagne Arbitration" (1989)4 Int'l J. Estuarine & Coastal L. 52. Concerning this arbitration,
see also W.T. Burke, "A Comment on the 'La Bretagne' Award of July 17, 1986: The
Arbitration Between Canada and France" (1988)25 San Diego L. Rev. 495. Concerning other
problems regarding the 1972Agreement, see D. Pharand, "TheCod War Between Canada and
France" (1987) Rev. Gen. Droit 627. Note also Canada-FranceCase, supranote 4 at para.16.
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ments subject to protracted negotiations.25 Despite the 1972 Agreement
involving obligations for Canada and France unrelated to the ocean area
and resources dispute, the protracted difficulties regarding the 1972
Agreement tainted the atmosphere of discussions about the overlapping
claims. Of more immediate relevance was the 1972 Agreement's displacement by 1986 of Metropolitan France fishers from the Gulf of St.
Lawrence. Canada was concerned that the displaced vessels would
relocate in the disputed waters around St. Pierre and Miquelon and
increase the pressure on the depleting fishery resources in the area.
2.3 Resources
A second complicating factor in the Canada-France dispute was the
location, importance and abundance of the living and non-living resources adjacent to St. Pierre and Miquelon. Although the hydrocarbon
potential of the disputed area was not fully assessed, the shelf area close
to the French islands showed little potential, while areas more distant
from the islands did appear to be promising. 26 Oil had been found east and
southwest of the disputed area. 27 The hydrocarbon resources were of
particular importance to France which was, and continues to be, overwhelmingly dependent upon imported oil and gas. 28 As one author
commented: "France has maintained a conspicuous presence on these
islands [St. Pierre and Miquelon] partly to assert its claim to potential oil
deposits in the surrounding Atlantic waters. '29 The location of possible
hydrocarbon resources and the scarcity of French-controlled reserves
were an important factor in the French calculations regarding an acceptable solution to the St. Pierre and Miquelon dispute.
Respecting living resources, Newfoundland, Canada's poorest province, relied heavily on the harvest of fishery resources for employment
and income: "The fishery has sustained the south coast communities [of
Newfoundland] for centuries. Without the fishery, the people of the south
coast of Newfoundland would not have a viable future."30 The history of

25. See generally Pharand, ibid. at 632-35.
26. See Day, supra note 10 at 71.
27. Approximately 50 significant discoveries of oil and gas have been in the East Coast
Canadian offshore area. The best known is the Hibernia find of 1979 off the coast of
Newfoundland. The only oil production, however, is from a small field offshore Nova Scotia.
28. On France's energy position, see generally N. Lucas, Western EuropeanEnergy Policies
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1985) at 1-62.
29. M.-C. Aquarone, "French Marine Policy in the 1970s and 1980s" (1988) 19 Ocean Dev.
& Int'l L. 267 at 276.
30. CanadianMemorial,supra note 10 at 69-70; see also 70-76.
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St. Pierre and Miquelon showed that fishing was the reason for its
survival.3 1 As well, France had a small distant water fishing fleet which
fished off the Canadian coast.3 2 The overall reduction in available living
resources in western Atlantic waters in the 1980s increased the competition between Canadian and French fishers for the living resources in the
disputed waters adjacent to St. Pierre and Miquelon. For Canada the
optimum resolution of the dispute was to eliminate or control the French
fishing effort respecting vulnerable fish stocks.
33

2.4 PoliticalPressuresin Canadaand France
Closely related to the problem of decreasing fish stocks was the complication of internal politics within both Canada and France. The French
distant water fishing fleet were a constituency to which the French
government had to respond.' At one point, a port in France was blockaded as part of a protest against the French government's handling of the
St. Pierre and Miquelon issue. The residents of St. Pierre and Miquelon
were upset with the French government's capitulation to Metropolitan
France's fishing interests 36 and with the deteriorating relationship that
existed in the mid-1980s with Canada. 37 The government of Newfoundland strongly opposed any perceived weakness or compromise of the

31. The British ceding of the islands to France was forfisheries purposes. Seethe 1763 Peace
Treaty, supra note 19 and the history of the French fishing rights, La Bretagne Arbitration,
supra note 20 at paras.7-9. How economically important the fishing industry is to St. Pierre
and Miquelon was a hotly debated issue before the Court of Arbitration. See Canadian
Memorial,supranote 10 at 76. French sources suggested that 40 per cent of the workforce were
employed by the fishery and that the fishery generated $10 million for the local economy
(Canadian Press, "Paris Supports Island Fishermen" The [Toronto]GlobeandMail(26 January
1989)).
32. Aquarone, supra note 29 at 270.
33. It is customary to consider thatin an international dispute only the States are participants.
As is explained in C. Chinkin & R. Sadurska, "The Anatomy of International Dispute
Resolution" (1991) 7 Ohio St. J. Dispute Res.39 at40-45, focussing narrowly only on the States
misses the true complexity of an international dispute and leads to misperceptions about the
causes and possible resolutions of international disputes.
34. See Aquarone, supra note 29 at 270.
35. Canadian Press, "Angry French plug port in protest" VictoriaTimes-Colonist(28 January
1989) A3.
36. See T. McDorman, "The Canada-France Maritime Boundary Case," supra note 14 at
185.
37. The Canadian-French dispute on fisheries escalated to the point of Canada suspending
operation of the 1972 Agreement which had a direct impact on St. Pierre and Miquelon fishing
in uncontested Canadian waters. This was not in the interest of the St. Pierre and Miquelon fleet.
See McDorman, "The Canada-France Maritime Boundary Case," ibid. at 164.
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Canadian government position regarding St. Pierre and Miquelon3 s and
at one stage withdrew in protest from the discussions. 9 These key
national constituencies made finding an acceptable compromise difficult
for the governments of both Canada and France.
2.5 Geography
The final complicating factor was geography. Canada's view of the
geography was that the small French islands, far distant from their home
country, could not possibly be entitled to a significant amount of ocean
space in the middle of the Canadian offshore zone.40 Such an argument
was a populist one, easily understandable in Canada. Because of this ease
of understanding, public support for a strong Canadian posture against
the French was easily obtained. However, the high degree of support for
the Canadian argument and the vigour with which it was proclaimed by
politicians made compromise difficult.
France rejected the Canadian viewpoint. France is the possessor of
small islands in the Caribbean, South Pacific, and Indian Ocean and a
precedent that restricted the area available to small, dependent islands
41
would be inconsistent with France's interests.
An important part of this geographic complication, particularly from
the Canadian viewpoint, was the acceptance by the 1977 Anglo-French
Arbitral Tribunalof France's argument that the British Channel Islands,
located near the coast of France, were to be disregarded in the drawing of
the main ocean boundary in the English Channel and that each of the

38. In 1987 Canada and France tentatively agreed to enter into negotiations to conclude a
special agreement to resolve the ocean boundary dispute by arbitration (Agreed Record of
Canada-France of 27 January 1987). Part of the agreement was an allocation to France of cod
in waters adjacent to Newfoundland. Concerning the 1987 Agreement, seePharand, supranote
24 at 635-40. The Newfoundland government was outraged by the action of the Canadian
government and a highly unusual meeting of provincial premiers took place to discuss the issue
(R. Martin and R. Sheppard, "Premiers Meet to Discuss Cod Treaty" The [Toronto]Globe and
Mail (10 February 1987) A1-A2). Moreover, the Canadian House of Commons had an
emergency debate about the 1987 accord. See House ofCommons Debates (27 January 1987)
at 2806-49. Newfoundland and St. Pierre and Miquelon fishers were able to agree to oppose
the tentative pact, another indication of the differing position of St. Pierre and Miquelon from
that of France (Canadian Press, "Fishermen Join Forces Against Pact" Vancouver Sun (6
February 1987) A6).
39. Canadian Press, "Peckford to Boycott Boundary Talks" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail
(18 September 1987) A4.
40. See CanadianMemorial,supra note 10 at 15.
41. See Aquarone, supra note 29 at276.
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British Channel Islands was entitled only to a small ocean area.42 Canada
felt strongly that France's desire for a large ocean area to be given St.
Pierre and Miquelon and France's argument that the Channel
Islands should be given only a limited ocean area was "a remarkable
43
inconsistency.
2.6 Conclusion
The Canada-France dispute arose from overlapping claims to an ocean
area south of St. Pierre and Miquelon, a logical consequence of the
developments in the law of the sea since the Second World War. Dealing
with the dispute was complicated by a 1972 bilateral treaty which
guaranteed a right for French fishers to access uncontested Canadian
waters, the conflicting perspectives of each country regarding the resources of the disputed area, the political pressures which existed in each
country, and the colouring of the reasonableness of any compromise by
the geography of the dispute. Against this background, it is appropriate

42. Delimitationof the ContinentalShelf between GreatBritainand France,30 June 1977
and 14 March 1978, 18 R.I.A.A. 3, 18 I.L.M. 397 atparas. 150, 161,166,198,202 [hereinafter
Anglo-FrenchAward]. See CanadianMemorial, supra note 10 at 194-98.
43. CanadianMemorial, supra note 10 at 196. The Court of Arbitration dismissed out-ofhand the relevance of the Channel Island precedent to the St. Pierre and Miquelon situation
(Canada-FranceCase, supranote 4 at para.42).
The reference to theAnglo-FrenchAward suggests that an additional complicating factor
was the international law of maritime boundary delimitation and the perceived legal strength
of each country's claim to the area and resources around St. Pierre and Miquelon. While the
Arbitration Tribunal heard and read the legal arguments of each country and sought to evaluate
their relative merits in reaching its decision, when engaged in negotiation the role of
international law would have been less important.
In the process of negotiating resolution of international disputes, countries utilize
international law to justify their claims and counterclaims. They may base their willingness to
compromise on the perceived legal strength of their argument, and a successful resolution may
be formulated in an internationally binding treaty. Seldom, if ever, will the negotiated solution
be dictated by principles of international law. Respecting international law and negotiation, see
M. Lachs, "International Law, Mediation, and Negotiation" in A.S. Lall, ed., Multilateral
NegotiationandMediation(New York: Pergamon Press, 1985) 183. See also R.B. Bilder, "An
Overview of International Dispute Settlement" (1986) 1 Emory J. Int'l Dispute Res. I at 5-6.
For maritime boundary disputes the above pattern is clear. States in conflict formulate
positions by reference to law and precedent, they may evaluate alternative solutions based on
the perceived strength of their legal argument, and, if an agreement is reached, put that
agreement in the form of a treaty. This process in maritime boundary delimitation disputes and
resolution is succinctly described in D.M. Johnston, The Theory and History of Ocean
Boundary-Making(Kingston, Ont.: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988) at 234. However,
a negotiated solution to a boundary problem inevitably is a series of compromises unrelated to
the principles of international law that exist for maritime boundary delimitation. This is
dictated by the political nature of any boundary, including a maritime boundary.
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to look at the dispute resolution mechanisms employed by Canada and
France.
3.0 Negotiation
3.1 Negotiation and Ocean Boundary Disputes
Regarding ocean area and resource allocation disputes, there is a rich
experience of negotiated arrangements which have been employed to
resolve or manage disputes. Negotiated resolution of overlapping ocean
claims has been accomplished through boundaries permanently dividing
areas in dispute, by boundaries permanently allocating resources in
disputed areas where the boundary for one resource regime (fisheries) is
not coincidental with the boundary for another resource regime (hydrocarbons),' and by the parties agreeing to permanently, or for an extended
period of time, jointly manage and share the resources of an area in
dispute. 5 Negotiations have also resulted in parties agreeing to manage
disputes4 6 pending the satisfactory resolution of the dispute through
standstill agreements, controlled access agreements, or agreements not to
challenge the other state's exercise ofjurisdiction.47 As one authority has
commented, "diplomacy seems to introduce the best prospect for ingenuity in ocean boundary-making"4 and this has been borne out by the

44. This type of ocean boundary is unusual with the best example being the boundary lines
created by the Treaty between PapuaNew Guinea andAustraliaConcerningSovereignty and
MaritimeBoundaries,18 December 1978,18 I.L.M. 291. About this treaty, see H. Burmeister,
"The Torres Strait Treaty: Ocean B oundary Delimitation by Agreement" (1982) 76 Am. J. Int'l
L. 321, and Johnston, supranote 43 at 219-20, who describes the Torres Strait Treaty at 219
"as a functionally sophisticated approach to ocean boundary-making."
45. Regarding joint development arrangements see H. Fox, ed., Joint Development of
Offshore Oil and Gas: Conference Papers (London: British Institute of International and
Comparative Law, 1990) and H. Fox et al., Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas: A
Model Agreementfor Statesfor JointDevelopment with ExplanatoryCommentary (London:
British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 1990).
46. It is sometimes impossible, particularly when sovereignty is in question, for countries to
proceed easily or quickly to dispute resolution. Hence, management of a dispute to prevent
escalation and to regularize contact is often important.
47. These management techniques for ocean boundary disputes are discussed by Johnston,
supra note 43 at 260-62.
48. Johnston, supra note 43 at 233; see also 258-59.
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practice of states.4 9 However, special constraints exist on negotiations
involving national jurisdiction or sovereignty.
[B]ilateral boundary negotiations tend to be heavily laden with emotional
freight. Even when kept secret or private they are likely to become
disputatious. Because of their symbolic significance they usually attract
the attention of politicians and the public at large more than most other
kinds of diplomacy. Not infrequently, therefore, the negotiators of a
boundary dispute find they are not the only actors, and that they are
required to negotiate with relatively little flexibility in accordance with
high-level political directives, which in turn may be perceived as a direct
expression of public opinion (or at least coloured by an awareness of public
sentiment).5 0
3.2 Negotiationand the St. Pierreand Miquelon Dispute
At various times during the negotiation process, Canada and France
agreed to refrain from measures and activities likely to inflame the
dispute. For example, in 1966 following each country's assertion of
jurisdiction overthe continental shelf adjacentto St. Pierre andMiquelon,
there was an agreement that no exploration activity would take place in
the disputed area.51 When each country extended its fishing jurisdiction
to 200 nautical miles, the two countries agreed to permit unchallenged
access to the disputed zone by fishers from both countries.12 Further, in
1984 the two countries agreed that neither would challenge the presence
of the other in the disputed zone and, in particular, that national fisheries
laws would not be enforced against one another in the disputed area. 3
These agreements were attempts to manage the dispute and prevent
54
direct, physical confrontations that could escalate it.
The moratorium on hydrocarbon exploration activity was successful
in keeping either country from obtaining significant advantage regarding
the resources or its legal position. Regarding living resources, however,
the two countries had a "non-confrontation" arrangement, but not a
49. A cursory review of the state practice on maritime boundary delimitation is provided in
Johnston, supra note 43 at213-22. For areview of state practice in the Pacific region, see D.M.
Johnston &M.J. Valencia, PacificOcean BoundaryProblems:Status andSolutions(Dordrecht,

The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991) at 62-77. For a review of state practice in a number
of regions, see D.M. Johnston & P.M. Saunders, eds., Ocean Boundary Making: Regional

Issues and Developments (New York: Croom Helm, 1987).
50. Johnston, supra note 43 at 27.
51. CanadianMemorial, supra note 10 at 109 and Day, supranote 10 at 70-71.

52. D. Jamieson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Remarks, House of Commons
Debates (5 November 1976) at 793.
53. The 1984 agreement was referred to by Siddon, supra note 18 at 2809-10.
54. The attempts to prevent escalation of the dispute were not always successful. See
McDorman, "The Canada-France Boundary Case," supra note 14 at 164.
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"no-exploitation" arrangement. The Canadian view was that it was "a
settled practice" that French fishers were entitled to 15.6 percent of the
total allowable catch [TAC] in the disputed area and that the TAC was to
be set by Canada.5 By the mid-1980s, France had clearly rejected
Canada's assumptions as French fishing activity in the disputed zone far
exceeded the "Canadian-allotted quota."5 6 Canada viewed the extent of
French fishing activity in the disputed zone as outrageous and it was this
outrage which ultimately led to an impasse in negotiations and to
arbitration.
During the lengthy negotiations Canada and France did not feel
57
constrained by traditional thinking on ocean boundary delimitation.
They explored numerous creative means to resolve the dispute. In the
earliest negotiations in the 1960s, the two countries focused upon the
French proposal to create a joint hydrocarbon resources arrangement in
the disputed area as a means of dealing with the dispute.s
As part of the 1972 fisheries agreement, Canada and France established an ocean boundary in the waters directly between the French
islands and the coast of Newfoundland. The boundary, a modified
equidistance line,59 was the product of compromises by both Canada and
France.' Following from this successful negotiation, in what has been
described as "the only real rapprochementbetween the Parties in nearly
20 years of negotiations,"61 came the 1972 Relev de Conclusions62which
provided that St. Pierre and Miquelon was to receive an exclusive zone
of 12 nautical miles around the islands and, in a defined zone beyond this
area, France was to have certain rights to explore and exploit hydrocarbon

55.

CounterCanada, Canada-France:Case ConcerningtheDelimitationofMaritimeAreas:

Memorial Submitted by Canada(Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1991) at 65 [hereinafter
CanadianCounter-Memorial]and Siddon, supranote 18 at 2810.

56. See McDorman, "The Canada-France Boundary Case," supra note 14 at 161-62 and
CanadianCounter-Memorial,supra note 55 at 60.

57. Traditional thinking would have involved seeking a single line to cover all ocean
activities and approaching the problem purely as a line-drawing exercise for the purpose of
dividing ocean space, as opposed to dealing with the resources, administrative necessity, and

other factors that are an important part of the boundary process.
58.

See CanadianMemorial, supra note 10 at 110-11.

59. So described in the analysis of the 1972 Canada-France boundary by the U.S. Dept. of
State, supra note 2; see also CanadianMemorial, supranote 10 at 112-13.

60. Described in CanadianMemorial,supra note 10 at 112-13.
61.

CanadianCounter-Memorial,supra note 55 at 80.

62. Reproduced in Canada, Canada-FranceCase Concerningthe DelimitationofMaritime
Areas:AnnexestotheMemorialSubmittedbyCanada,vol. 1 (Ottawa: Governmentof Canada,

1990) B-2, 85.
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resources. 63 Despite the arrival of 200 nautical mile fishing zones in the
mid-1970s, France continued to press Canada to accept the 1972 compromise 64 indicating that the apparent trade-off of fish for Canada and
hydrocarbons for France was acceptable. Canada ultimately rejected the
proposed trade-off in the 1972 Relevg de Conclusions.65 However, the
idea of a fish for oil trade-off was subsequently discussed in 1984 when
it was reported that Canada had proposed a comprehensive package
involving joint fisheries management and hydrocarbon resource sharing
in the disputed zone. 66 The full extent of these discussions have not been
made public. It is reasonable to assume, given the sophistication in ocean
policy matters of both Canada and France, that the negotiators explored
a wide range of cooperative arrangements, joint development and administrative zones, and other trade-offs, none of which were successful as a
basis for a negotiated solution.
As French fishing activity in the disputed area increased and negotiations to resolve the dispute stalled, Canada, which had previously
rebuffed French overtures to adjudicate,67 concluded that adjudication
was appropriate. The goal of negotiations, therefore, changed from
dispute resolution to the reaching of an agreement for third party
assistance in resolving the dispute. In January 1987, the two countries
formally agreed to negotiate to conclude a special agreement to utilize
international arbitration to resolve the overlapping claims dispute. 68 In
order to induce French acceptance of this agreement, Canada provided
significant fish quotas to French fishers under the 1972 bilateral fishing
agreement. 69 Moreover, Canada agreed that an interim fishing agreement
for the disputed area was a prerequisite to submission of the dispute to
adjudication.70 Canadian negotiators found themselves in the position of

63.

The Court of Arbitration dismissed the relevance of the 1972 Relevi des Conclusions

primarily because it dealt only with shelf issues. Also, it was not approved by the two States
and consequently had "no standing as an agreement between them" (Canada-FranceCase,

supra note 4 at paras. 90-91).
64. See CanadianMemorial, supranote 10 at 115-16.
65. See M. MacGuigan, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Minutes of Proceeding and
Evidence of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defense (No. 69)

(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 4May 1982) at 12-13 and CanadianMemorial,supranote 10 at 116.
66. J. Meek, "Canada Makes New Offer in Boundary Dispute" The [Halifax] ChronicleHerald(10 May 1984) 3.
67. See A.J. MacEachern, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Remarks, House of
Commons Debates (28 March 1983) at 24212.
68. Agreed Record of Canada-France of 27 January 1987 (unofficial translation). See
generally Pharand, supra note 24 at 635-38.
69. See Pharand, supra note 24 at 635-38 and the material cited in supranote 38.
70. CanadianCounter-Memorial,supranote 55 at 68.
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complaining about excessive French fishing activity being detrimental to
Canadian interests, but having to provide quotas to the French in order to
induce an agreement to arbitrate.
The January 1987 accord, which was intended as an agreement to
assist in dispute resolution, had the unfortunate effect of escalating the
dispute. Negotiations on an interim fisheries arrangement for the disputed
zone broke down; Canada declined to allocate a quota for French fishing
vessels in undisputed Canadian waters as required under both the 1972
and 1987Agreements; fishing vessels from both countries were seized in
the disputed zone; France recalled its Ambassador from Ottawa; and
Canadian citizens were arbitrarily delayed at Parisian airports. 71 Relations only improved when a new prime minister was installed following
the Spring 1988 French elections.
Following the intervention of a mediator, in March 1989 Canada and
France agreed to submit the overlapping claims dispute to international
arbitration.7 2 In order to achieve this agreement, Canada had to provide
a significant quota to the French in uncontested Canadian waters.73 In the
disputed area Canada and France agreed to disagree over the quota to be
taken by French fishers.
The two decades of Canada-France negotiations involved creativity,
intransigence, compromise, a desire to manage the dispute, and an
entanglement of the ocean area dispute with the disagreement over
Canada's 1972 treaty obligations to French fishers. The inability of
negotiations to resolve the dispute without the intervention of third
parties was because of inopportune timing. French flexibility of the 1960s
and 70s was met by Canadian uncertainty and intransigence. Canada's
attempted compromises in the 1980s were unacceptable to France. The
agreement to submit the dispute to arbitration, however, was the result of
successful negotiation, although mediator assisted, 74 hence the negotiation process was not a total failure.

71. See McDorman, "The Canada-France Boundary Case," supra note 14 at 164; see also
CanadianCounter-Memorial,supra note 55 at 68-70.
72. The 1989 Compromis, supra note 3.

73. Agreement relating to Fisheries for the Years 1989-91, 30 March 1989, Canada-France;
Canadian Note Verbale No. 220 to France (30 March 1989); and French Note Verbale to
Canada (30 March 1989) (documents released by Canadian Department of External Affairs and
Fisheries and Oceans). See McDorman, "The Canada-France Boundary Case," supranote 14
at 164-65, especially note 49.
74. See infra, section 4.2.
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4.0 Non-Adjudicative Third Party Intervention
4.1 Employment in Ocean Boundary Disputes
Third party intervention in an international dispute is only acceptable
when the disputing states'
own efforts to reach a negotiated settlement have been unavailing and are
at an impasse, and where neither prefers such a failure to reach agreement
to the alternative possibility of continuing to seek settlement through
assistance by, or delegation to, third parties. In this case, both parties may
choose to ask third parties for help in their attempts to reach an agreement
or, at the extreme, they may7 5simply ask or allow a third party to determine
the settlement or outcome.

Non-adjudicative third party intervention can take several forms: good
offices, mediation, fact-finding, inquiry, and conciliation. While attempts are made to differentiate the various forms, 7 6 ultimately States
utilize whatever variation they deem appropriate to assist in dispute
resolution. Mediation is usually distinguished from conciliation. 77 With
mediation there is a limited intervention by a third party with the usual
goal being to facilitate negotiations either by direct suggestion of proposals or assistance in reconciliation of an impasse in an informal manner.
Conciliation, however, usually involves a more formal intervention by a
third party seeking to establish the facts in dispute and create non-binding
recommendations for resolution of a dispute.
Both mediation and conciliation have been used to resolve ocean area
and resource allocation disputes.7 8 Chile and Argentina, on the brink of

75. R.B. Bilder, "International Third Party Dispute Settlement" (1989) 17 Denver J. Int'l L.
& Pol. 471 at 477-78.
76. See L.B. Sohn, "The Future of Dispute Settlement" in R.St.J. Macdonald & D.M.
Johnston, eds., The Structureand Processof InternationalLaw: Essays in Legal Philosophy,
Doctrine, and Theory (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983) 1123 at 1123-25.
77. See Bilder, supra note 43 at 24; Sohn, ibid.; and J.G. Merrills, InternationalDispute
Settlement, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Grotius, 1991) at 27-42, 57-79. Mediation and conciliation
have a number of similarities. First, employment of non-adjudicative third party intermediaries
must be by agreement of the disputants. The parties have to agree upon the choice of third party,
the function of the intervenor, and what results are expected. Second, non-adjudicative third
party intervention has as its goal the facilitating of a negotiated solution. Neither mediation or
conciliation completely removes resolution of the dispute from the control of the disputants,
hence the mechanisms are extensions of the negotiating process. Third, a willingness to use
mediation or conciliation indicates the disputants interests in compromise, with the role of the
intervenor to find that middle ground. Mediation in particular, but also conciliation, is not used
by parties to force a favoured resolution on the other party. Fourth, but related to the third point,
is that recommendations made during a mediation or conciliation process are not strict
applications of law, they are politically based and designed to be acceptable to both parties. The
latter three points distinguish mediation and conciliation from third party adjudication.
78. See generally Johnston, supranote 43 at 268-70.
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war in 1979, agreed to the mediation role of the Vatican and, in particular,
Cardinal Antonio Samore in their ocean boundary dispute. 79 In 1984, an
agreement was reached resolving the boundary dispute between the two
countries. 80 A conciliation commission established by Iceland and Norway proposed a compromise regarding the ocean area and resources
around Jan Mayen that was ultimately accepted by the two countries.81
Finally, the dispute settlement regime of the 1982 LOS Convention
directs that, where states are unable to successfully negotiate resolution
of an ocean boundary dispute or are unable to agree to adjudicate the
dispute, compulsory conciliation is to be utilized. s2 The negotiators ofthe
LOS Convention clearly gave to conciliation "a prominent place" in its
elaborate dispute settlement regime.83
4.2 Use In the St. Pierreand Miquelon Dispute
Faced with a breakdown in negotiations in 1988, Canada and France
sought the assistance of Enrique Iglesias of Uruguay as mediator.84 As
one commentator has stated:
Since mediation usually is conducted in circumstances of extreme political
delicacy, it may be counter-productive to publish any document or
otherwise disclose the nature of the mediator's input.... [Tihe success of
the mediation is measured in terms of persuasiveness, and successful
mediation brings the parties to (or back to) the negotiating table, if not to
an actual agreement on a boundary settlement or arrangement."

79. Described in Johnston, supra note 43 at 192-96 and T. Princen, Intermediariesin
InternationalConflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) at 133-85.
80. Treaty of Friendshipand Peace between Argentina and Chile, 29 November 1984, 24
I.L.M. 11.
81. ConciliationCommission Report, supra note 9; and see E.L. Richardson, "Jan Mayen In
Perspective" (1988) 82 Am. J. Int'l L. 443 and Johnston, supranote 43 at 159-63.
82. Article 280 of the LOS Convention, supra note 8, provides that parties to any ocean
dispute can agree to utilize whatever peaceful means they wish to resolve the dispute. Only if
a party is unhappy with the activities or non-activities taking place under Article 280 may a
State turn to the formal dispute settlement regime of the LOS Convention. While adjudication
through either arbitration, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, or the International
Court of Justice is the primary mechanism for dispute resolution, by declaration a State can
exclude ocean boundary disputes from the adjudicative process. In such a case, the mechanism
to be employed is compulsory conciliation. See LOS Convention, supra note 8, arts. 287,
298(l) and A.O. Adede, The System for Settlement of Disputes Under the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987) at
277-81.
83. Merrills, supra note 77 at 163-64.
84. Canadian Press, "Uruguayan to Mediate Fish Dispute" The [Toronto] Globe andMail (3
November 1988).
85. Johnston, supra note 43 at 270.
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True to this view of mediation, the work of the mediator in the CanadaFrance dispute is evident only in the resulting arrangements. These were
the March 1989 agreement to submit the overlapping claims dispute to
binding arbitration coupled with the allocation of quotas to French
vessels in Canadian waters and the agreement to disagree about French
quotas in the disputed area.86
The two countries apparently never contemplated the use of mediation
or conciliation to directly assist in resolving the ocean area and resources
issue. Given the unquestioned predominance of negotiation as a means of
peacefully resolving international disputes, any employment of a third
party intervenor is an unusual step. Canada and France jumped directly
to a binding, adjudicative third party mechanism regarding the overlapping claim disputes and by-passed the use of non-adjudicative third party
intervention. Given the variation of schemes and trade-offs discussed by
the parties during negotiations, the unwillingness (or inability) to utilize
either mediation or conciliation as a means to facilitate reaching a
resolution can be seen as a missed opportunity.
As with the limited success of negotiations, so too with the non-use of
helpful third party intervention, timing appears to have been the most
important factor.87 Prior to the mid-1980s, the two states felt that third
party intervention was premature as bilateral negotiations were seen as
productive. By the mid-1980s the time for non-adjudicative third party
intervention had passed. Negotiations had been frustrated for many years,
numerous compromise packages had been suggested and rejected, and
any process that prolonged negotiation was seen, by Canada at least, as
detrimental to the health of the living resources in the disputed area.

86. The 1989 Compromis,supranote 3. The fisheries agreements are noted insupranote 73.

87. Timing is given of one of the three crucial aspects of third-party intervention in disputes
by Chinkin & Sadurska, supra note 33 at 65. Specific to mediation, timing is discussed by
Merrills, supra note 77 at 30-32. At 31-32, he comments:

Mediation is likely to be particularly relevant when a dispute has progressed to a stage
which compels the parties to rethink their policies. A stalemate is clearly one such
situation; another is when the parties come to recognize that the risks of continuing a
dispute outweigh the costs of trying to end it.

More generally on timing and dispute settlement, see Rubin, "The Timing of Ripeness and the
Ripeness of Timing" in L. Kriesberg & S.J. Thorson, eds., Timing the De-escalation of
InternationalConflicts (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1991) 237.
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5.0 InternationalAdjudication
5.1 Employment in Ocean Boundary Disputes
In only the rarest of situations do disputing States rely on adjudication to
resolve or assist them in resolving an international dispute. The reluctance to utilize adjudication arises principally because disputing States
lose control over the process and result and hence the opportunity for an
unacceptable outcome is enhanced." As one distinguished authority has
written: 9
[Governments] recognize that there is a place, and even a necessity, for
adjudication but as the record shows, the actual recourse to arbitration or
courts is comparatively minimal in relation to the number of legal disputes
that concem them. It is no great mystery why they are reluctant to have
their disputes adjudicated. Litigation is uncertain, time consuming, troublesome. Political officials do not want to lose control of a case that they might
resolve by negotiation or political pressures. Diplomats naturally prefer
diplomacy; political leaders value persuasion, manoeuvre and flexibility.
States do not want to risk losing a case when the stakes are high or be
troubled with litigation in minor matters.
Deciding whether to utilize adjudication involves a careful calculation
of positives and negatives. Almost all international adjudication is the
product of an agreement by the parties that it should be used.90 Essential
to this agreement is the role to be played by the decision of the adjudicative tribunal in the resolution of the dispute and what type of tribunal is
to be utilized. States can utilize adjudication in a number of ways, for
example, to fully resolve a dispute; to clarify legal principles that will
assist countries in negotiating a resolution; or to deal with one aspect of
a much larger dispute. Hence, adjudication can be seen as dispositive
(actually resolving the dispute) or facilitative (making a decision that will
assist the disputants in reaching a negotiated solution). 91
88. See generally Bilder, supra note 43 at 15.
89. 0. Schachter, "International Law in Theory and Practice" (1982) 178 Recueil des Cours
9 at 208.
90. Agreement to adjudicate can be achieved after a dispute has arisen or can be given prior
to a dispute arising where a State accepts in a treaty to adjudicate when disagreements arise
about that treaty or the State accepts the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to
adjudicate disputes. Where priorconsentto adjudicate is involved, the situation can arise where
a State is an unwilling partner to litigation and this may even go so far that a state will refuse
to participate in the litigation even though it had previously agreed to do so. See generally T.D.
Gill, Litigation Strategy at the InternationalCourt (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1989) at 70-74. Where the consent of a State to adjudicate has been given prior to a
dispute arising, the record of litigation in resolving disputes is not good. See Gross, "Compulsory Jurisdiction under the Optional Clause" in L.F. Danrosch et al., eds., InternationalCourt
of Justice at a Crossroads(Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Transnational, 1987) 45.
91. Johnston, supra note 43 at 29, 237-38.
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Two forms of international adjudication exist-judicial settlement,
usually the International Court of Justice, and arbitration. Both lead to
binding decisions. While differences exist in the operation of the International Court and arbitration panels, 92 the most significant difference is in
the selection of the members of the tribunal. The International Court has
its membership and procedural rules established by multilateral agreement. 93 An arbitration tribunal is created by the disputing parties which
determine its membership and rules of procedure. 94 The conventional
view is that arbitration provides more flexibility for the parties than
recourse to the International Court or similar permanent judicial body.
In a surprising number of situations States have agreed to utilize
international adjudication, either the International Court of Justice 95 or ad
hoc arbitration tribunals, 96 to assist them in resolving overlapping ocean
claim disputes. One commentator has noted:
Most states are reluctant to submit to an international process of adjudication, whether in the form of litigation or arbitration. But national pride is
often at stake in a boundary dispute, and the human obsession with
territoriality seems to account for the relatively high incidence of boundary-related issues
among disputes that are submitted to international
97
adjudication.
In several cases, the role assigned the tribunal has been to pronounce
upon the appropriate rules and principles to guide the disputants in
resolving their overlapping claims. 9 In other words, the adjudication was
designed to assist the parties in reaching a negotiated solution. More

92. See Sohn, supranote 76 at 1125-30 and Merrills, supranote 77 at 80-154.
93. See generally Merrills, ibid. at 109-30.
94. Merrills, ibid.
95. North Sea ContinentalShelf Cases (FederalRepublic ofGermany v. Denmark; Federal
Republic ofGermany v. The Netherlands), [1969] I.C.J. Rep. 3; ContinentalShelf(Tunisia v.
LibyanArabJamahiriya),[1982] I.C.J. Rep. 18; Delimitationof the MaritimeBoundaryin the
Gulf of MaineArea (Canadav. UnitedStates), [1984] I.C.J. Rep. 246; and ContinentalSheIf
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriyav. Malta), [1985] I.C.J. Rep. 13.
96. Anglo-French Award, supra note 42 and Tribunal arbitralpour la dilimitation de la
frontiare maritime (Guineav. Guinea Bissau), 25 I.L.M. 251.
97. Johnston, supra note 43 at 9-10.
98. In particular, see the NorthSea ContinentalShelfCases,supranote 95. This approach was
also used in Continental Shelf (Libya/Tunisia),supra note 95.
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recently, tribunals have been requested to construct or have taken on the
task of constructing an ocean boundary for the disputants. 99
While adjudicative bodies are limited to considering legal principles,
the international law on ocean boundary delimitation directs that the
principal task of a tribunal is to reach an equitable result. 1' ° Hence, ocean
boundary tribunals have a wide range of options in crafting awards.
Tribunals, in evaluating whether a boundary result is equitable, must be
aware of the political acceptability of their decision to the disputing
parties. This acceptability arises from the logical and persuasive reasoning of the tribunal, the tribunal's response to the arguments presented, and
the nature of the compromise struck by the tribunal. One authority has
stated:
It is submitted that, in practice, States are aware of, and accept, the element
of compromise inherent in the intemationaljudicial process. What they are
less prepared to accept is a process which is either divorced from the
arguments that they have addressed to the Court, or which seems to deny
them the opportunity to be heard on all the essential issues which form the
foundation for eventual judgment of the Court.''
It has been argued elsewhere that it is a tribunal's freedom from doctrinal
rigidity in ocean2 boundary cases that has led States to utilize adjudication
10
so frequently.
The major limitation that has existed in boundary adjudication, however, has been the emphasis placed on the resolution of the ocean area
dispute as opposed to the ocean resource dispute. Tribunals, drawing their

99. Delimitationofthe MaritimeBoundary in the GulfofMaine Area, supra note 95 and the
Anglo-FrenchAward, supranote 42. In the ContinentaiSheIf(Libya/Malta),supra note 95, the

International Court, while not requested to draw the ocean boundary, proceeded to do so as a
means of answering the questions presented. It was this boundary that was ultimately accepted
by the two countries. SeeAgreementImplementing Article III of the SpecialAgreementand the
Judgement of the InternationalCourtof Justice, Malta-Libya, 10 November 1986, reprinted
in U. Leanza & L. Sico, eds., MediterraneanContinentalShelf, vol. 1 (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.:

Oceana, 1988) at 117.
100. The norm for maritime boundary delimitation was described in the Canada-France
Case, supra note 4 at para. 38, as follows:

The Parties are in agreement with respect to the fundamental norm to be applied in this
case, which requires the delimitation to be effected in accordance with equitable
principles, or equitable criteria, taking account of all the relevant circumstances, in
order to achieve an equitable result. The underlying premise of this fundamental norm
is the emphasis on equity and the rejection of an obligatory method.
101. Bowett, "Contemporary Developments in Legal Techniques in the Settlement of
Disputes" (1983) 180 Recueil des Cours 200 at 200-01.
102. See Bowett, supra note 101 at 191, 198-200; Johnston, supra note 43 at 246; and T.

McDorman, "The Libya-Malta Case: Opposite States Confront the Court" (1986) 24 Can.
Y.B. Int'l L. 355 at 362-64.
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jurisdiction from the agreement by the parties to litigate, have been
required to draw a single ocean boundary which has lead to reliance upon
geography (a line being a geographic construct) in their decisions and
ignoring resource use, management and the economic and social reliance
upon the resources by the disputants. For example, in the Gulf ofMaine
case, the dispute was over fisheries allocation, yet the decision virtually
ignored fishery considerations.l"3 Where a tribunal draws a boundary that
apparently resolves an overlapping claim dispute, there is frequently a
need for the two countries to negotiate respecting resource sharing and
management across the boundary and respecting enforcement issues. 104
5.2 Use in the St. Pierreand Miquelon Dispute
During the first round of negotiations between Canada and France in the
late 1960s, the possibility of adjudication was discussed. 05 In the mid1970s, France and the United Kingdom employed an arbitration panel 0to6
deal with overlapping ocean claims in the English Channel area.
Canada agreed to use a Chamber of the International Court to litigate with
the United States regarding the Gulf of Maine.' Moreover, in 1985
Canada and France agreed to use international adjudication to resolve
differences arising under the 1972 Canada-France fisheries accord.106 It
is not surprising, therefore, that Canada and France viewed international
adjudication as an acceptable option in their overlapping claims dispute
respecting St. Pierre and Miquelon. 1°9
Other factors important in the decision to adjudicate included the
frustrating, failed negotiations; the urgency, from a resource point of

103. See T. McDorman, P. Saunders & D. VanderZwaag, "The Gulf of Maine Boundary:
Dropping Anchor or Setting a Course?" (1985) 9 Marine Policy 90 at 101.
104. In the Gulf of Maine region between Canada and the United States, the ocean boundary

has not obviated the need for bilateral fisheries management. Differences in regulatory
approach to the fishery, however, have been a major stumbling block between the two
countries. See generally D. VanderZwaag, The Fish Feud (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington
Books, 1983) at 37-87. Despite the need, the two countries have been unable to develop a
cooperative approach to cross-boundary fisheries management. The two countries, however,
have been able to reach an accord on fisheries enforcement in the vicinity of the boundary. See
D. Russell, "International Ocean Boundary Issues and Management Arrangements" in D.
VanderZwaag, ed., CanadianOceanLaw and Policy (Markham, Ont.: Butterworths Canada,
1992) 479.
105. CanadianMemorial,supra note 10 at 111.
106. Anglo-FrenchAward, supranote 42.

107. Delimitationof the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of MaineArea, supra note 95.
108. La Bretagne Arbitration,supranote 20.

109. Past history and shared values are two of a number of considerations that are important
when states seek strategies to resolve international disputes. Note Bilder, supranote 43 at 14.
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view, of a resolution; the perceived strength by each country of their legal
and political arguments; the non-vital nature of the issue in dispute
coupled with the negative role the dispute was having on general CanadaFrance relations; and the realization that an adjudicative-created compromise would be more politically acceptable to a "losing" disputant than a
similar, negotiated compromise. The litigation gamble for Canada appears to have been greater than for France. If the French were successful
in arguing for a broad ocean area, the effects upon Canadian fishing
activity would be significant. If Canada was successful in its argument for
a 12 nautical mile enclave for St. Pierre and Miquelon, fishing vessels
from France would be displaced but, through the 1972 Canada-France
fisheries accord, fishers from the French islands would be protected 10
The two countries opted to employ a five-member ad hoc Arbitration
Tribunal to which each country appointed a national.1" The parties
agreed to have the Tribunal construct a single maritime boundary for all
purposes." 2 As noted above, the requirement that the line be for all
purposes had become the general practice, although in the situation of this
case it appeared to have been motivated by French fears that previous
discussions of multiple, functional lines would undermine its legal
argument.1 3
Both States hoped that the adjudication would resolve both the ocean
area and resources dispute. If the Tribunal adopted the Canadian position
of only a 12 nautical mile zone for the French islands, then French fishing
would be easily controlled and the activities would have less impact on
the worsening stock depletion crisis. If the Tribunal accepted the French
argument of a broad zone for the islands determined by reliance on
equidistance, then Canadian fishers could be eliminated from the area and
resource harvesting and management (fish and oil) would fall exclusively
to France. Neither country offered a significant middle ground to the
Tribunal.
In June 1992 the five-member Arbitration panel announced its decision. The Tribunal rejected the Canadian proposition that the extent of

110. Admittedly, this is a very Canadian view.
11I. The selections by Canada and France reflected the strengths of their positions. France
appointed a strong supporter ofequidistance and a legal technician. Canada appointed a former
bureaucrat who could advocate the equities of the case. SeeT. McDorman, "Canada and France
Agree to Arbitration for the St. Pierre and Miquelon Boundary Dispute" (1990) 5 Int'l J.
Estuarine & Coastal L. 357. The other tribunal members were Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga,
President; Professor Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz; and Professor Oscar Schachter.
112. The 1989 Compromis,supra note 3, art. 2(1). See generally McDorman, "The Canada-

France Boundary Case," supra note 14 at 167-68.
113. See McDorman, "The Canada-France Boundary Case," ibid. at 168-69.
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maritime rights of an island was lessened by political status, size or length
of coastline. 11 4 Equally rejected was the French position that equidistance
was the appropriate method to be employed." 5 The Tribunal created an
ocean boundary that gave a 12 nautical mile zone to St. Pierre and
Miquelon, a further 12 nautical miles for the western sector of the islands,
and an extremely curious 10.5 nautical mile corridor which reaches 200
nautical miles into the Atlantic Ocean from the southern sector of St.
Pierre and Miquelon.1 6 Immediate reaction to the Award was mixed,7
although generally Canadian officials felt the decision was favourable.1
The countries had hoped that the Adjudication would resolve the
resources dispute by resolving the ocean area dispute. However, while
resolving the ocean space allocation dispute, the Adjudication only
partially resolved the ocean resources allocation dispute. The 10.5
nautical mile corridor which extends into the Atlantic Ocean 200 nautical
miles ensures that France has a role to play in resource management
discussions. The corridor forces Canada to include France in decisionmaking about resources, yet France is aware that its voice is weak. The
corridor forces cooperation, if resources are to be optimally protected and
utilized. The Tribunal was aware that its decision was going to create a
need for further negotiation in order to fully resolve the Canada-France
dispute around St. Pierre and Miquelon.118
The Adjudication failed to resolve the ocean resources dispute because
it was constrained by its single-line mandate and previous adjudications
to deal only with the ocean area dispute. Moreover, the Tribunal was
constrained by the expected outcome of such an adjudication, namely,
that the boundary line would be based on some degree of compromise. 1 9
It is, therefore, not surprising that the Adjudication has not fully resolved
the dispute between Canada and France since the mechanism has inherent
rigidities and limitations.
114. Canada-FranceCase, supra note 4 at paras. 44-52.
115. Canada-FranceCase, supra note 4 at paras. 41,64-65.
116. Canada-FranceCase, supra note 4 at paras. 66-71. A most insightful analysis of the

decision has been done by G.P. Politakis, "The French-Canadian Arbitration Around St. Pierre
and Miquelon: Unmasked Opportunism and the Triumph of the Unexpected" (1993) 8 Int'l J.
Marine & Coastal L. 105-34. See also Y. Marston, "St. Pierre-Miquelon Arbitration: CanadaFrance Delimitation Award" (1993) 17 Marine Policy 155-70 and L. de La Fayette, "The

Award in the Canada-France Maritime Boundary Arbitration" (1993) 8 Int'l J. Marine &
Coastal L. 77.
117. J. Sallot, "Court Rejects MaritimeBoundary Claims" The [Toronto]GlobeandMail(1

June 1992) Al; C. Woodward, "Canada Hauls in Fish Border Win" Victoria Times-Colonist
(11 June 1992) A1-A2; and K. Cox, "Officials Celebrate Fisheries Decision" The [Toronto]
Globe and Mail (12 June 1992) A5.

118. See Canada-FranceCase, supra note 4 at paras. 84-87.
119. See Bowett, supra 101 at 191, 198-200.

The Search for Resolution of the Canada-France Ocean Dispute

While the Adjudication did not fully resolve the ocean resources
dispute around St. Pierre and Miquelon, the Tribunal's decision has
changed the character of the dispute. Rather than an emotive sovereignty
clash, the continuing difficulties are about the best way for neighbours to
share a dwindling resource. It is a "common good" dispute, rather than a
"yours and mine" dispute. Both countries know their respective ocean
areas and the ultimate geographic limits of the rights. The most important
effect of the Tribunal's decision has been the removal of the St. Pierre and
Miquelon dispute from the front page of newspapers and the top agenda
item of Canada-France relations.
6.0 The ContinuingSearch ForResolution
An international dispute is only resolved "when each of the parties cease
to have a continuing sense of grievance, or atleast ceases actively to assert
its claim."' 2 After 25 years of effort, Canada and France have successfully resolved the ocean area dispute, but not the resource allocation
dispute, in the waters around St. Pierre and Miquelon. The Adjudication
has forced the two countries back to negotiations. The post-Tribunal
negotiations between Canada and France have not resulted in any
agreement on resource allocation. In January 1993, fishers from St. Pierre
and Miquelon staged a highly visible protest of the lack of progress in
talks."' The virtual collapse of Canada's East Coast fishery 122 has
increased the difficulty of discussions.
7.0 Conclusion
The Canada-France dispute over the ocean area and resources adjacent
to the French islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon located a few miles off
the Canadian East Coast is an interesting example of the employment by
two countries of different international dispute settlement mechanisms.
For twenty years the countries engaged in negotiations that were at times
productive and at other times non-productive. By the mid-1980s it was
perceived that negotiations on the main issues in dispute, ocean space and
resource allocation, were no longer going to be fruitful. A mediator was
accepted to assist the two countries to develop an interim fishing accord

120. Bilder, supra note 43 at 28.
121. See "Cod Protest arrests" supra note 5 and "Protest Islands Face Bleak Future" Fishing
News International(March 1993) 6-7.
122. See "Canada's 2-year Northern Ban Starts" FishingNews International(August 1992)
4-5; "Northern Cod Fall Goes On" FishingNews International(July 1993) 3; and "More
Closures in Groundfish Crisis" FishingNews International(October 1993) 56.
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and to reach agreement to submit the boundary dispute to binding, thirdparty adjudication. The result of the adjudication is an allocation of ocean
space which, although apparently favouring Canada, is a compromise
between the positions taken by the two countries in litigation. 123 While the
areas of national jurisdiction are no longer in question, the resources issue
cannot be said to be resolved despite the adjudication. Over 25 years of
negotiation, mediation and adjudication have left the two countries only
part way to a final resolution of the international dispute.
Appendix A
Map of Canada-FranceMaritimeBoundary DelimitationAward

From G. Marston, "St. Pierre-Miquelon Arbitration: Canada-France Maritime Delimitation Award" (1993) 17 Marine Policy 155 at 156.

123. 'This Court does not consider that either of the proposed solutions provides even a
starting point for the delimitation" (Canada-FranceCase, supra note 4 at para. 65).

